Fourth and 2? how the Patriots really lost

It seems often that the NFL is a place where common sense is most easily applied in a manner that contradicts the opinion of punditry or coaching. Last night I watched the Patriots blow a 13 point lead in the 4rth quarter to Manning in the Colts and could scarcely believe what I had witnessed.

Some overall impressions I had of the game were that,
A). The Patriots O-line is still one of the best in the NFL. They get out on screen passes and make blocks downfield until the whistle stops. Kazcur had big problems with Mathis but the backup LT Vullmer was able to handle Dwight Freeney one-on-one and that’s a huge accomplishment. The Colt’s pass rush was really quite inadequate for dealing with the Pats pass-offense.

B). The only real running game for the Pats is the draw game. When they want to line up and just run the ball they are less effective. Running the ball is a major threat from the Patriots in instances and formations where the short pass to welker, or the deep pass to Moss are also likely.

C). What Manning is doing with these corp of receivers is very impressive. To me it is reminiscent of the Patriots offense pre-Moss although Manning still has Reggie Wayne.

D). Both teams lack lock-down corners and were dependent on 2 deep safeties to reliably contain Moss and Reggie Wayne from simply torching them. As it was, both receivers were still devastating.

Ultimately I thought the Patriots clock management and offensive playcalls in the 4rth quarter were poor and the reason for their shocking defeat. The Pats ran the ball, in a few short drives, 6 times for a total of 3 yards. No run went for more than 2 yards. To successfully run out the clock while holding a lead a team needs to actually sustain a drive.

It is a frustrating misconception, that you must run the ball while ahead, to win. Running out the clock is extremely valuable and running plays are the easiest way to do that. However, sustained drives regardless of whether they result in points are most important. What’s better? Driving 60 yards and kick a field goal while passing and stopping the clock some or to drive 20 yards with an ineffectual running game before punting? Which is more likely to burn clock? Which would have helped the Patriots more?

Ultimately you would prefer to be able to line up in the I-formation and run the ball effectively in the 4rth quarter on a drained defense. But if you can’t do so, and you’re facing Peyton Manning, it’s much smarter to keep your foot on the throat and keep scoring. It’s more risky to punt often and not score than to keep pushing the pace and piling up points while risking stopping the clock or turnovers.

In addition to playing too conservative on offense in the 4rth quarter, the Patriots managed to squander all their timeouts in the 2nd half well before the 2 minute mark. The opportunity to challenge the 4rth and 2 spot by the officials should have been automatic. It was a very close call, I personally think that it was a first down. If the Patriots had challenged it perhaps it’s most likely that there would have been insufficient evidence to overturn the spot and award a first down but the Patriots should have at least given themselves the chance to make a challenge.

What’s been most frustrating to me from this game, in addition to having watched the Patriots lose a game late in the 4rth quarter to an undefeated rival, has been hearing the analysis across the country condemning Belichek for his decision to go for it on 4rth down. Smartfootball.com did some quick math that concluded that the odds dictate a 4rth down attempt because the probability of conversion is high and the odds of stopping Manning weren’t great. He had 2 timeouts, 2 minutes and an exhausted defense to work against which he had been steadily picking apart throughout the quarter.

The odds of winning include the odds of converting the 4rth down in addition to the odds of preventing a touchdown from the 30 yard line. Together those make a compelling case. The opposite is the odds of stopping Manning and the punt return from scoring a TD in 2 minutes with 2 timeouts.

Is it a gutsy call? Only in the sense that failure draws greater criticism, mathematically the real risk was to punt the ball. Colin Cowherd, sometimes buffoon, argued today on the radio that it was somehow less respectful of Manning’s prowess to go for it on 4rth down? Really? The option that goes to greater lengths to prevent Manning from touching the ball is riskier?

Certainly the game came down to the 4rth quarter drive, however the circumstances that lead to that play had a much greater impact on the outcome of the game. The Patriots inability to run the ball in traditional sets in obvious running situations mixed with a failure to adjust playcalling to address that shortcoming allowed the Colts opportunities to get back in the game.

The 4rth quarter call is only criticized because it failed, much like the USC call on 4rth and 2 vs. Vince Young that would have been the Trojan’s best chance at stopping number 10 from taking the crystal ball.